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Introduction to the Organizational Economics  
of Inter-organizational Systems 
 
JoongHo Ahn, College of Business Administration, Seoul National University, jahn@snu.ac.kr 





This paper describes the current research approaches 
and directions on the organizational economics of inter-
organizational systems, and suggests an alternative 
perspective to the conventional approach, transaction cost 
economics. This paper concludes with suggestions on 





Information technology, especially Internet, has been 
changing the way firms do business. Information 
technology enabling easy and cheap connections between 
firms blurs the boundaries of the firm, and thus making 
firms cooperate and compete in an unprecedented way. 
Firms could enjoy the producing efficiencies of the markets 
and the operating efficiencies of the hierarchies at the same 
time. 
Inter-organizational system is defined as “information 
and communication technology-based systems that 
transcend legal enterprise boundaries” (Bakos, 1991) and as 
yet, the studies on the organizational economics of inter-
organizational systems were performed mainly from the 
viewpoint of transaction cost economics (Malone, Yates, 
and Benjamin, 1987; Clemons, Reddi, and Row, 1993; 
Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991; Hess and Kemerer, 1994; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1994). Transaction cost 
economics provides a firm ground to investigate various 
aspects of inter-organizational relationship with well-
defined constructs although it has some limitations caused 
from its rationality assumptions and market failure 
approach. However, to investigate into the organizational 
economics of inter-organizational systems all the relevant 
theories and propositions need to be integrated so as to 
come up with a comprehensive view. 
We briefly review the transaction cost economics 
approach and suggest an alternative approach to 
organizational economics of inter-organizational systems. 
Then suggestions on incorporating other relevant theories 
follow. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Transaction cost economics is a comparative 
institutional approach to economic organization, in which 
technology is de-emphasized in favor of organization, and 
the economizing action resides in the details of transactions 
and the mechanisms of governance. That is a predictive 
theory of economic organization in which a large number 
of apparently dissimilar phenomena are shown to be 
variations on a few key transaction cost economizing 
themes (Williamson, 1996). 
 
In his article, Coase views the firm as a governance 
structure, and market as an alterative means to conduct 
similar transactions (Coase, 1937), which is the beginning 
of the transaction cost economics. Williamson has made 
considerable contributions to transaction cost economics by 
identifying types of exchanges that are more appropriately 
conducted within firm boundaries than within the market 
and by augmenting Coase’s initial framework (Williamson, 
1975, 1985, 1996). 
Williamson’s framework is based on assumptions of 
human behavior (bounded rationality, opportunism) and 
dimensions of transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty). 
Bounded rationality is the assumption that decision 
makers have constraints on their cognitive capabilities and 
limits on their rationality. Although decision makers intend 
to act rationally this intention may be circumscribed by 
their limited information processing and communication 
ability (Simon, 1957). Williamson defines opportunism as 
“self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975). It is 
the assumption that, given the opportunity, decision makers 
may seek to serve self-interests. 
Asset specificity refers to the transferability of the 
assets that support a given transaction (Williamson, 1985). 
Assets with high amount of specificity represent sunk cost 
that has little value outside of a particular exchange 
relationship. Uncertainty means not-known and/or not-
determined condition and classified into environmental and 
behavioral uncertainties. Environmental uncertainty raises 
an adaptation problem, which is difficulty with modifying 
agreements to changing circumstances. The effect of 
behavioral uncertainty is a performance evaluation problem, 
which is difficulty with verifying whether compliance with 
established agreements has occurred (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). 
The basic premise of transaction cost economics is that 
if transaction cost is low or absent – that is cost incurred 
from adaptation, performance evaluation, and safeguarding 
cost – economic actors would favor market governance 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). If transaction cost is too 
high then, economic actors would resort to hierarchy 
governance. The implicit assumption behind this basic 
premise is that hierarchy has more operating efficiencies 
than market and market has more producing efficiencies 
than hierarchy. 
Transaction cost economics has been widely applied to 
many inter-organizational information systems researches. 
Because of its nature transaction cost economics is used 
mostly to exploratory studies that predict the future of 
inter-firm relationship. Previous exploratory predictive 
researches focus on the changes of transaction cost with 
inter-organizational systems, eventual changes of inter-
organizational relationship, and performance impact of the 
change of governance mode. 
Below are some of the researches accomplished in the 
transaction cost economics framework. 
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Application of Transaction Cost Economics to 
Inter-organizational Systems 
 
Malone, Yates, and Benjamin predicted market-like 
arrangement would prevail because electronic brokerage 
effect would exceed electronic integration effect (Malone, 
Yates, and Benjamin, 1987). Several researchers tried to 
predict the changes of inter-organizational relationship 
differently after this hypothesis was formulated. 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson included non-contractible 
investments in their economic model and argued that 
market-like inter-organizational relationship would not be 
effective considering incentive implication of the non-
contractible investments (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1997). 
Clemons, Reddi, and Row argued the move to the middle 
hypothesis (Clemons, Reddi, and Row, 1993). Their idea 
was that electronic commerce would not only reduce 
transaction cost but also transaction risk. Increasing market 
transactions due to the reduction of transaction cost means 
more outsourcing and also more transaction risk, and thus 
the relationship will move to the middle. Gurbaxani and 
Whang incorporating agency theory and transaction cost 
economics predicts the size of the firm (Gurbaxani and 
Whang, 1991). 
Hess and Kemerer examined the electronic market 
hypothesis using finance industry subject in a proprietary 
system environment and failed to verify the electronic 
market hypothesis (Hess and Kemerer, 1994). Zaheer and 
Venkatraman tried to empirically find the determinants of 
electronic integration and found asset specificity, trust and 
size of the firm influenced the electronic integration 
(Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1994). 
 
Limitations of Previous Research Based on 
Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Until now, the empirical researches are rare and 
exploratory, theoretical, predictive studies are the usual 
case. That is because of the predictive nature of transaction 
cost economics and measurement problems of its constructs. 
It is not easy to develop instruments to measure such 
constructs as opportunism and asset specificity, and if good 
instruments are developed and validated, it is often limited 
and only applicable to the specific research context. 
Information technology provides the opportunities that 
firms could reduce transaction costs when they interact 
with partner firms, and also internal transaction cost when 
they operate. Previous researches applied transaction cost 
constructs to the electronically connected environment, and 
the focus lied on the effects of changes of transaction cost 
structure on the change of governance mode. However, 
inter-organizational systems research should also 
investigate into the ex-post problems such as development 
of efficient control mechanisms. 
To investigate into the adoption and use of inter-
organizational systems and eventual changes in the inter-
organizational relationship, all the relevant theories should 
be integrated and provide a comprehensive view. Recent 
development and application of information technologies 
write different stories from the previous researches. Many 
virtual organizations, electronic business communities 
appear and disappear just for one day. The comprehensive 
researches on the organizational economics of inter-
organizational systems should be provided to explain the 
present status and to predict the future development. 
Alternative Approaches 
 
It is also important to incorporate relevant theories into 
the inter-organizational systems research. Transaction cost 
economics is just one of the theories modeling inter-
organizational economics. Below are some of the theories 
applicable to organizational economics of inter-
organizational systems research. Each theory views inter-
organizational relationships from different perspective, and 
provides a firm ground to study organizational economics 
of inter-organizational systems. All the relevant theories 
should be incorporated into the study of inter-
organizational systems for comprehensive understanding of 




As an alternative approach to the mode of governance, 
network perspective could give valuable insights to the 
inter-organizational systems research. In his article, Powell 
pointed out the limitations of transaction cost approach. 
It fails to capture the complex realities of exchange. The 
continuum view also misconstrues patterns of economic 
development and blinds us to the role played by reciprocity 
and collaboration as alternative governance mechanisms. 
By sticking to the twin pillars of markets and hierarchies, 
our attention is deflected from a diversity of organizational 
designs that are neither fish nor fowl, nor some mongrel 
hybrid, but a distinctly different from them (Powell, 1990). 
Table 1. summarizes some of the key differences among 
markets, hierarchies, and networks. 
 
Table 1. Stylized Comparison of Forms of Economic 
Organization (1990, Powell) 
 
Forms 
Key Features Market Hierarchy Network 







Means of  
Communication 










Degree of  
Flexibility 
High Low Medium 
Amount of 
Commitment 
Low Medium to 
High 












Independent Dependent Interdependent 
 
Network perspective could be an alternative approach 
to view the inter-organizational relationships and could be a 
useful framework to investigate into inter-organizational 




Resource dependence theory views inter-firm 
governance as a strategic response to conditions of 
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uncertainty and dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Few organizations are internally self-sufficient with respect 
to critical resources, and in this sense problems are 
dependence on the parties who obtained focal resources, 
and difficulties of decision-making based on accurate 
prediction caused by out of full resource control. 
The main premise of resource dependence theory is that 
firms will seek to reduce uncertainty and manage 
dependence by purposely structuring their exchange 
relationships by means of establishing formal or 
semiformal links with other firms (Ulrich and Barney, 
1984). 
Resource dependence perspective could be an 
alternative approach to view the inter-organizational 
relationships and could be easily incorporated into the 




Trust and commitment are important constructs 
explaining inter-firm relationships and trust is proved to 
have relations with relationship commitment. Trust is a 
multi-faceted construct. Rational perspective of trust 
centers on the calculus of self-interest and the social 
perspective of trust centers around moral duty. Rational 
perspective of trust is the obverse of opportunism, and it 
has been used several times in the inter-organizational 
systems researches that are mainly based on transaction 
cost economics. Transaction cost economics assumes 
bounded rationality, and social perspective of trust was 
naturally excluded from the researches. Power is also an 
important construct to explain inter-firm relationship. 
Power/Dependence model would be useful to explain 
adoption and use of inter-organizational systems. 
Dependence is a function of the proportion of the 
dependent organization’s need for resources or services that 
the other organization can provide, and the inverse 
proportion of the ability of any other organization to 
provide the same resources or services (Emerson, 1962). 
The more dependent a firm is to the partner, the greater the 
partner’s power to influence a firm’s decision making. 
So far, inter-organizational systems research focus on 
the rational aspects of inter-organizational relationships and 




We have shown the current status of the organizational 
economics research of inter-organizational systems. 
Previous researches in this field usually applied transaction 
cost economics to investigate the various aspects of inter-
organizational systems. We pointed out some of the 
limitations of transaction cost approach to this area. Also 
we suggested some good relevant theories to incorporate 
for comprehensive understanding of the inter-
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